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TEN COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
Peter K. Yu*
INTRODUCTION

With the entering into effect of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' ("TRIPs Agreement") and
growing respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and traditional
communities, the human rights implications for intellectual property
protection have attracted unprecedented
attention. When
policymakers, international bureaucrats, intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations, and scholars examine these
implications, they usually employ one of two approaches: the conflict
* Copyright 0 2007 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law & Director,
Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Faculty of
Law, University of Hong Kong; Research Fellow, Center for Studies of Intellectual Property Rights,
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the "IP
International: Intellectual Property for the Global Marketplace" Symposium at Georgia State University
College of Law on March 23, 2007. Some of the answers in this Article were adapted from Peter K. Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1039 (2007). In collecting these answers, the Author benefited from discussion in the 15th
Fordham Annual International Intellectual Property and Policy Conference at Fordham University
School of Law, the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Central States Law Schools Association at Louis D.
Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville, the 2006 Work-in-Progress Intellectual Property
Colloquium at University of Pittsburgh School of Law, "Intellectual Property and Social Justice"
Symposium at University of California Davis School of Law, the 2005 Annual Meeting of Law and
Society Association in Las Vegas, the Eighth Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of
Law, Culture, and the Humanities at the University of Texas at Austin, the Second National People of
Color Scholarship Conference at The George Washington University Law School, the International
Symposium on the Information Society, Human Dignity and Human Rights at the Palais des Nations in
Geneva and McGill University Faculty of Law, and faculty workshops at Brooklyn Law School and
Dalhousie Law School. He would like to thank Michael Landau for his kind invitation to and hospitality
in this Symposium and Graeme Austin, Susan Bitensky, Donald Chisum, Margaret Chon, Rosemary
Coombe, Jessica Darraby, Ronan Deazley, Edward Janger, Beryl Jones, Peter Leuprecht, Michael
Madison, Robin Malloy, Stephen Marks, Samuel Murnmba, Chidi Oguamanam, Sean Pager, Kal
Raustiala, Susan Scafidi, Teresa Scassa, Christopher Serkin, Katja Weckstrom, Margaret Ann
Wilkinson, Alfred Yen, and especially Laurence Helfer, for asking provocative questions that inspired
this Article. He is also grateful to Lisa Hammond for excellent research and editorial assistance.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments---Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
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approach or the coexistence approach. 2 While the conflict approach
views the two sets of rights as being in fundamental conflict, the
coexistence approach considers them essentially compatible.
For example, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights has taken the conflict approach, noting
that "actual or potential conflicts exist between the implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, social and
cultural rights . . . . Meanwhile, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) has embraced the coexistence approach, emphasizing the
availability of built-in flexibilities in existing international trade
agreements. 4 Taking a similar approach, the High Commissioner of
Human Rights also noted that "[tihe balance between public and
private interests found under [the international human rights
'5
instruments] is one familiar to intellectual property law. ,
Although each of these approaches has its benefits and drawbacks,
both of them ignore the fact that some attributes of intellectual
property rights are protected in international or regional human
rights instruments while other attributes do not have any human
2. For discussions of the two approaches, see Paul Torremans, Copyright as a Human Right, in
COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PRIVACY 1,

2-3 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004); Laurence R. Heifer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property:
Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 48-49 (2003).
3. Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2000/7,
pmbl., recital 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7],
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b I 3c 12569700046704e?Opendocument
; see Intellectual Property and Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2001/21, pmbl.,
recital 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/21 (Aug. 16, 2001) (reiterating that "actual or potential
conflict exists between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic,
social and cultural rights, in particular the rights to self-determination, food, housing, work, health and
education, and in relation to transfers of technology to developing countries"), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.2001.21 .En?Opendocume
nt.
4. See WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO], Protection of Intellectual Property Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/18 (Nov. 27, 2000) [hereinafter WTO Submission], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/292864197888d603c 12569ba00543291 ?Opendocument.
5. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human
Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on
Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner, 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2i2001/13 (June 27,
2001),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/5905161 04e92e8
7bc 1256aa8004a8191/$FILE/G01 14345.pdf.
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rights basis at all. Thus, instead of inquiring whether human rights
and intellectual property rights conflict or coexist with each other, it
is important to identify the human rights attributes of intellectual
property rights and distinguish them from the non-human rights
aspects of intellectual property protection.
To avoid confusion with the so-called intellectual property rightsa catch-all term that is used to describe copyrights, patents,
trademarks, trade secrets, and other existing or newly-created related
rights-this article uses the term "the right to the protection of moral
and material interests in intellectual creations"-or, its shorter form,
"the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations."
Although these terms seem long and clumsy, they are superior to
their shorthand counterparts, as the latter tends to "obscure the real
6
meaning of the obligations that these rights impose."
In a recent article, I explored ways to develop a human rights
framework for intellectual property and to resolve the tension and
conflict between human rights and the non-human-rights aspects of
intellectual property protection. 7 As the article noted, it is important
to separate the conflicts between human rights and intellectual
property rights into two sets of conflicts: external conflicts and
internal conflicts. While external conflicts lie at the intersection of
the human rights and intellectual property regimes, internal conflicts
exist only within the human rights regime.
With respect to external conflicts, it is important to separate the
human rights aspects of intellectual property protection from others
that have no human rights basis. Once the human rights attributes
have been identified, one can use the principle of human rights
primacy to resolve the conflicts. While the principle may be useful in
many cases, it does not resolve all conflicts, especially those in areas
in which the concerned human right is only vaguely defined or its
outer contours insufficiently developed.
6.

MAGDALENA

SEPUJLVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL

(2003).
7. Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual PropertyInterests in a Human Rights Framework,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007).
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 8
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Thus, it is important to ensure that the principle not be abused in
efforts that seek to discredit existing intellectual property rights. To
be certain, the continuous expansion of intellectual property rights is
alarming and has greatly threatened the interests of many less
developed countries. However, unjustified restriction of intellectual
property rights is equally dangerous, as it would undermine, rather
than correct, the balance of the intellectual property system. Because
those attributes or forms of intellectual property rights that do not
have a human rights basis are likely to be deemed less important
through a human rights lens, it is important to appreciate and
carefully evaluate the many important interests protected by the nonhuman rights attributes or forms of intellectual property rights.
With respect to internal conflicts, however, the principle of human
rights primacy is inapplicable, because all of the conflicting rights
have a human rights basis. Thus, one has to rely on one or more of
the three complementary approaches-the just remuneration
approach, the core minimum approach, and the progressive
realization approach. The just remuneration approach is ideal for
situations involving an inevitable conflict between two human
rights-for example, between the right to the protection of interests
8
in intellectual creations and the right to freedom of expression.
Under this approach, authors and inventors hold a right to
remuneration (rather than exclusive control) while individuals obtain
a human rights-based compulsory license (as compared to a free
license). The core minimum approach, in contrast, provides guidance
on the minimum essential levels of protection a state has to offer to
comply with its human rights obligations. 9 That approach seeks to
balance the state's obligations against the inevitable constraints
created by a scarcity of natural and economic resources. Finally, the
progressive realization approach offers insight into the noncompeting relationship amongst the different rights protected in
international or regional human rights treaties.' 0 This final approach
8. For a discussion of the just remuneration approach, see id.at 1095-1105.
9. For a discussion of the core minimum approach, see id.at 1105-13.
10. For a discussion of the progressive realization approach, see id. at 1113-23.
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is important, because human rights are not only universal
entitlements, but also empowerment rights-rights that enable
individuals to benefit from other equally important rights."l
Notwithstanding the importance of developing a human rights
framework for intellectual property and the ability to use that
framework to develop a more balanced intellectual property system,
the proposed framework has raised many difficult questions-some
of them are foundational, some of them conceptual, and the
remainder merely implementational. This Article tackles in turn ten
questions I frequently encounter in discussing the development of
this framework. Although I organize this article around these
questions, it is important to keep in mind that each of these questions
often raises other issues that have been addressed elsewhere. Thus,
the discussion in one part of the article may inform or be informed by
discussion in another part. It is my hope that a better understanding of
the answers to these ten questions will help promote a constructive
and fruitful dialogue concerning the interplay of intellectual property
and human rights.
QUESTION

1: ARE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS?

The characterization of the right to the protection of interests in
intellectual creations as a human right has invited questions
concerning why that particular right-and, sometimes more broadly,
intellectual property rights-should be equated with fundamental
human rights, which include prohibition on genocide, slavery, and
torture; the rights to freedom of thought, expression, association, and
religion; and the rights to life, food, health, basic education, and
work. As some commentators point out, the inclusion in the human
rights debate of a relatively trivial item like intellectual property
11. See, e.g., Fons Coomans, In Search of the Core Content of the Right to Education, in CORE
OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 217, 219
(Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell eds., 2002) [hereinafter CORE OBLIGATIONS] (characterizing the right
to education as an empowerment right); Yu, supra note 7, at 1114 (characterizing the right to the
protection of interests in intellectual creations as an empowerment right).
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protection would undermine the claim that human rights are of
fundamental importance to humanity. 12 Such inclusion may also
revive the old, and somewhat lingering, debate about whether
economic, social, and cultural rights should be considered as
significant as civil and political rights, or the so-called "first
generation" human rights.13
During the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), delegates already questioned whether the right to the
protection of interests in intellectual creations should be considered a
basic human right. As British delegate F. Corbet noted, "the
declaration of human rights should be universal in nature and only
recognize general principles that were valid for all men [and
women]."' 4 Alan Watt, her Australian colleague, also added that "the
indisputable rights of the intellectual worker could not appear beside
fundamental rights of a more general nature, such as freedom of
thought, religious freedom or the right to work."' 15 It is therefore no
surprise that Audrey Chapman found that the drafting history
supported "relatively weak claims of intellectual property as a human
16
right."'
Nevertheless, regardless of whether one agrees that the right to the
protection of interests in intellectual creations should be elevated to a
human right, that right was explicitly recognized in the UDHR and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
12. See Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposalfor Quality Control, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 607 (1984) (expressing concern that the continuous proclamation of new human rights will

undermine both the fundamental nature of human rights and the integrity of the process of recognizing
those rights); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE xi (1991):

A rapidly expanding catalog of rights.. . not only multiplies the occasions for collisions, but
it risks trivializing core democratic values. A tendency to frame nearly every social
controversy in terms of a clash of rights... impedes compromise, mutual understanding, and
the discovery of common ground.
13. For discussions of the separation between "first generation" rights and "second" or "third
generation" rights, see sources cited in Yu, supra note 7, at 1074 n.143.
14.

JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING,

AND INTENT 221 (1999).

15. Id.
16. Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obligations Related to ICESCR Article 15(l)(c), in CORE
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 11, at 305, 314.
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(ICESCR). Article 27(2) of the UDHR states that "[e]veryone has the
right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she]
is the author."' 7 Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR also requires each
state party to the Covenant to "recognize the right of everyone...
[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which
he [or she] is the author."'1 8 Because human rights are "universal,
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated,"' 9 the right to the
protection of interests in intellectual creations should be treated just
like any other human rights.
Objections, however, can be raised about whether human rights
should be interpreted by reference to international or regional human
rights instruments. As Richard Falk explained, there are two different
jurisprudential schools of human rights:
The positivists consider the content of human rights to be
determined by the texts agreed upon by states and embodied in
valid treaties, or determined by obligatory state practice attaining
the status of binding international custom. The naturalists, on the
other hand, regard the content of human rights as principally
based upon immutable values that endow standards and norms
20
with a universal validity.
According to William Fisher and Talha Syed, the positivist approach
has two main weaknesses:
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27(2), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
18. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(l)(c), Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
19. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declarationand Programmeof
Action, 15, U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] ("All human
available at
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated."),
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF. I 57.23.En.
20. Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 44, 44 (Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Naim ed., 1992) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS INCROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES].
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First, by tying a right to health strictly to what is recognized in
legal documents the analysis limits its scope of protection to
claims against governments acting within their own sovereign
territories (and, perhaps, only to certain types of "negative"
claims). Second, implementing the right requires knowing what
its substantive requirements should be and how tradeoffs with
other rights or priorities are to be made, and to answer those
questions adequately we need to draw on extra-legal normative
considerations. 1
One could also add a third weakness concerning how this approach
would encourage one to ignore important goals and interests that
have strong moral bases but have yet to be recognized politically by
the international community.
Notwithstanding these weaknesses,
future human rights
discussions in the intellectual property area are likely to focus on
positive rights that are explicitly recognized in international or
regional human rights instruments, rather than conceptual rights that
are derived from abstract moral considerations. There are at least
three primary reasons. First, as the histories of the UDHR and the
ICESR have shown, it was difficult enough for states to achieve a
political consensus on the rights recognized in the two instruments.
Given the divergent interests, backgrounds, beliefs, and philosophies,
it is virtually impossible to achieve an international philosophical
consensus on these rights.2 2 Thus, it makes great pragmatic sense to
focus on a right that has already attained international consensus, if
not universal agreement. If countries cannot agree on what the rights
and obligations are, they are unlikely to be able to resolve the conflict
between human rights and the non-human rights aspects of
intellectual property protection.
21. William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the
Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 642 (2007) (footnote omitted).

22. The fact that humanity or human nature serves as the source of human rights has made it
particularly difficult to achieve this consensus. As Jack Donnelly reminded us, "few issues in moral or
political philosophy are more contentious or intractable than theories of human nature." JACK
DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 16 (2d ed. 2003).
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Second, international human rights instruments, like the UDHR
and the ICESCR, thus far have received significant attention in the
international debate concerning the human rights implications for
intellectual property rights. The plain language of these instruments,
therefore, is likely to have a significant impact on the future
development of the international intellectual property regime. While
commentators may still question whether the UDHR has now
achieved the status of customary international law, 23 there is no
denial that the Declaration, along with other international or regional
human rights instruments, has achieved an international normative
and
intergovernmental
governments
consensus.24 National
organizations, such as the WTO or the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), are likely to refer to these documents in their
discussion of the tension and conflict between human rights and
intellectual property rights.
Third, based on how international agreements are usually drafted,
the provisions in the international or regional human rights
instruments do not necessarily have a commonly agreed-upon
purpose (other than a broad one, such as the promotion of human
dignity and respect). Indeed, as James Nickel pointed out, "people
can agree on human rights without agreeing on the grounds of human
rights. 25 During treaty drafting processes, delegates often harbor
disparate concerns and vote for the provisions based on different
motivations. In the context of article 27 of the UDHR, these
motivations included the protection of moral rights, international
harmonization, and collateral realization of other human rights. No
one can pinpoint exactly what motivated the delegates to adopt that
particular provision.

23. See Yu, supra note 7, at 1046 n.16.
24. See DONNELLY, supra note 22, at 17 ("[T]here is a remarkable international normative consensus
on the list of rights contained in the Universal Declaration and the International Human Rights
Covenants."); id. at 40-41 (discussing the concept of "overlapping consensus on international human
rights").
25. JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (2d ed. 2007).
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Moreover, no matter how much foresight the drafters had,
international instruments usually cannot escape the realpolitik of
international negotiations. As one commentator noted:
[H]uman rights codifications inevitably convey a somewhat
incomplete, or even biased, image of what human rights really
are. All of them have been drafted and enacted under specific
political and economic circumstances, and therefore reflect the
mindsets and specific concerns of their drafters and the time they
lived in. They are often the fruit of political compromise-a
constraint to which moral truth is not exposed.26
As Jack Donnelly noted, human rights are far from "timeless,
unchanging, or absolute; any list or conception of human rights-and
the idea of human rights itself-is historically specific and
' 27
contingent.
QUESTION 2: BESIDES ACCESS TO MEDICINES, ARE THERE OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES THAT IMPLICATE THE PROTECTION

OF HUMAN RIGHTS?

Thus far, the lack of access to medicines in Africa and other less
developed countries and the resulting public health crises concerning
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria have caught widespread
international attention. 2 8 However, access to medicines is not the only
intellectual property issue implicating the protection of human rights.
26. Jakob Comides, Human Rights andIntellectual Property: Conflict or Convergence, 7 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 135, 137 (2004).
27. DONNELLY, supranote 22, at i.
28. See Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics Such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2004/26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 16, 2004)
[hereinafter Res. 2004/26], available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4RES-2004-26.doc. For discussions of TRIPs developments in relation to access to medicines, see
generally NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (Pedro Roffe
et al. eds., 2006); Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World PharmaceuticalTrade
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317 (2005); Peter K. Yu, The International
Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827 (2007).
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Other important issues include access to computer software, cultural
and educational materials, patented seeds and food products as well
as the protection of traditional knowledge and indigenous materials.
Among the rights implicated in these situations are the right to food,
the right to health, the right to education, the right to selfdetermination, the right to freedom of expression, the right to cultural
participation and development, and the right to the benefits of
scientific progress.
One may question whether the lack of, say, access to cultural and
educational materials poses as grave a danger as the lack of access to
29
medicines. While the latter threatens the lives of millions of people,
the former seems to have only limited effects on individual lives. As
Leslie Kurtz recently noted, issues related to culture and creativity
are generally not considered "life and death issues., 30 Professor Kurtz
may be correct, but the lack of access to cultural and educational
materials should not be ignored.
The difference between the lack of access to medicines and the
lack of access to cultural and educational materials is like the
difference between dying now and dying slowly later. While the lack
of access to medicines will lead to deaths in the immediate future, the
lack of access to educational and cultural materials may result in slow
deaths in the distant future, sometimes across generations. As
Professor Nickel reminded us, "[s]aving people's lives will often
have special priority, but life loses much of its value if the other
requirements of making it decent are not met." 31 Recently, Margaret
Chon also noted that "[t]o the extent that development is driven not
only by economic growth but also by cultural and social change,

29. See Comm'n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and
Development Policy: Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 30 (2002) (stating that
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria "claimed nearly six million lives [in2001], and led to debilitating
at
available
more"),
millions
for
illness
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/fnalreport/CEPRfullfinal.pdf.
30. Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright and the Human Condition, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1233, 1233
(2007).
31.

NICKEL, supra note 25, at 67.
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education is foundational. 3 2 Thus, the only redeeming differences
between the lack of access to medicines and the lack of access to
cultural and educational materials seem to be urgency and the fact
that the damage caused by the latter can be alleviated--or even
reversed, if given enough time and attention.
Some commentators may further question the need for the
development of a human rights framework for intellectual property
by pointing out that the conflicts between human rights and
intellectual property rights arise in only a few areas. 33 According to
them, the two sets of rights coexist peacefully and happily in a large
number of areas. Many of them, such as the right to freedom of
expression, even have common goals. As Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor reminded us in Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,"it should not be forgotten that the Framers [of the U.S.
Constitution] intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
34
expression."
There are several responses, however. To the extent that human
rights and intellectual property rights serve similar goals, the
development of a human rights framework can only be beneficial,
because it will promote and reinforce the underlying goals of these
two sets of rights. To the extent that human rights and intellectual
property rights are in conflict, however, the framework is urgent and
necessary. The fact that there are limited or no conflicts in other areas
does not mean that the existing conflicts are unimportant. Moreover,
as intellectual property rights continue to expand, the expanded rights
are likely to pose conflicts in other unforeseen areas. The sooner we

32. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property 'from Below": Copyright and Capabilityfor Education,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 819 (2007); see also RUTH L. OKEDIJI, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
SYSTEM:

LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS

AND PUBLIC

INTEREST

CONSIDERATIONS

FOR DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 2 (2006) ("[W]ith regard to education and basic scientific knowledge, limitations and

exceptions are an important component in creating an environment in which domestic economic
initiatives and development policies can take root. A well-informed, educated and skilled citizenry is
indispensable
to
the
development
process."),
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc2006lOen.pdf.
33. Thanks to Beryl Jones for pushing me on this important question.
34. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
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take account of the needs for human rights protection, the more
balanced the intellectual property system will become.
QUESTION 3: SHOULD PATENTS BE SEPARATED FROM COPYRIGHTS IN
THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE?

In a recent article, Rochelle Dreyfuss distinguished the human
rights basis of patents from that of copyrights. As she explained:
There may well be important differences between the intellectual
endeavors protected by copyrights and the material protected by
patents. It is far easier to see a human rights dimension in the
case of the former. After all, expression and personality are
intimately intertwined. Because one can learn a great deal about
a person from what he has said and how he has said it, protecting
expression safeguards human dignity. But it is hard to make that
case for a product or process, where value resides in
functionality and not in the identity of the inventor. There is
nothing about a product or a process (or for that matter, a newly
discovered principle of nature) that trenches upon the personality
of the inventor. For example, we know a great deal about
Thomas Edison. But we know it from reading his papers, not
from turning on his light bulb. Accordingly, while a case can be
made for giving Edison control over his output as an author, it is
hard to argue that he deserves that protection as an inventor.35

Professor Dreyfuss's careful analysis is strongly supported by the
design of the existing patent system. While individual inventors enjoy
the right to have their names attached to a patent, 36 they do not have a
35. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where Is the Paradox? (footnote
omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-=929498; accord Wendy J. Gordon & Keren Ben Shahar,
Current Patent Laws Cannot Claim the Backing of Human Rights (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
36. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, art. 4ter, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (stipulating that "the inventor
shall have the right to be mentioned as such in the patent").
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legal right to protect the integrity of their inventions.37 Nor does the
law allow a second inventor to make, use, offer for sale, sell, or
import the same or an "equivalent" invention. 38 As the late Robert
Nozick pointed out: "An inventor's patent does not deprive others of
an object which would not exist if not for the inventor. Yet patents
would have this effect on others who independently invent the
object.1

39

While the denial of human rights basis of patents and the
subordination of those rights under the principle of human rights
primacy no doubt would promote other human rights, such as the
right to health or the right to food, there is considerable evidence to
suggest that inventors should not be excluded from human rights
protection. First, the texts of international human rights instruments,
such as the UDHR or the ICESCR, recognize explicitly "the right...
to... the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is
the author. ' 4° Although the texts mention only the "author," but not
the "inventor," they use the phrase "scientific, literary or artistic
production," rather than the phrase "literary, artistic or scientific
work"-the phrase that was originally proposed by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) during the drafting of the now-abandoned Covenant on
Human Rights, the single-covenant predecessor to the ICESCR and
41
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
By using the phrase "scientific production," the instruments therefore
offer broader protection than the mere protection of scientific works.
37. See Justin Hughes, The PhilosophyofIntellectualProperty, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 351 (1988).
38. For discussions of the doctrine of equivalents, see generally Michael D. Pendleton, When the
Same Patent Means Different Things in Different Jurisdictions: A Comparative Analysis of Patent
Interpretation,in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN

THE DIGITAL AGE 83 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Protection Under the Modern
Doctrine of Equivalents and Implied Disclaimer Doctrines, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH, supra, at 55.

39. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 182 (1974).
40. UDHR, supra note 17, art. 27(2); ICESCR, supra note 18, art. 15(1)(c).
41. Maria Green, Int'l Anti-Poverty L. Ctr., Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c) of the
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 16, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/15 (Oct.
9, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C. 12.2000.15.En?Opendocument.
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Second, the word "scientific" has been used in other provisions in
the instruments, and the right to the protection of interests in
intellectual creations is "intrinsically linked" to such other rights as
the right to cultural participation and development and the right to the
benefits of scientific progress.42 During the drafting of the UDHR,
the delegates were widely concerned about the abuse of science and
technology during the Second World War and the wide use of
conscripted scientists and engineers in Nazi Germany and Stalinist
Russia.43 They therefore called for stronger protection of intellectual
labor in the human rights regime. For example, Mexican delegate
Pablo Campos Ortiz identified the right to the protection of interests
in intellectual creations as a right of the individual as "an intellectual
worker, artist, scientist or writer."" Likewise, after discussing an
article that dealt with freedom of thought, Peruvian delegate Jos6
Encinas stated that "it seemed pertinent now to recognize freedom of
creative thought, in order to protect it from harmful pressures which
' 5
were only too frequent in recent history. A
Similar statements can be found in the drafting history of the
ICESCR. The Swedish delegation stated that "the protection of those
rights [in article 15] would be an encouragement to science and
creative activity., 46 The Israeli delegation maintained that "[i]t would
be impossible to give effective encouragement to the development of
42. See ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment No. 17:
The Right of Everyone to Benefitfrom the Protectionofthe Moral and MaterialInterests Resulting from
Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Productionof Which He Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph1(c), of
the Covenant), 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter General Comment No. 17]
(stating that the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations is "intrinsically linked to the
other
rights
recognized
in
article
15
of
the
Covenant"),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bldc7b4043c1256a450044f33 1/03902145edbbe797c12571150
0584ea8/$FILE/G0640060.pdf.
43. See AUDREY CHAPMAN, A HuMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,

SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS, AND ACCESS TO THE BENEFITS OF SCIENCE 6 (1998) ("Like other provisions of
the UDHR, the context for drafting Article 27 was the widespread reaction to the Nazi genocide and the
brutality of World War II."), http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/papers/pdf/chapman.pdf;
Richard Pierre Claude, Scientists' Rights and the Human Right to the Benefits of Science, in CORE
OBLIGATIONS, supranote 11, at 247, 249-50 (discussing the abuse of science and scientists for purposes
of power aggrandizement).
44. MORSINK, supra note 14, at 221.
45. Id. at 218.
46. Green, supra note 41,138.
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47
culture unless the rights of authors and scientists were protected.
Even today, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR), the authoritative interpretive body of the ICESCR,
describes the obligations in articles 15(1)(c) and 15(3) as "a material
safeguard for the freedom of scientific research and creative
activity.,48
Third, patent protection was specifically discussed during the
drafting of the ICESCR. As Maria Green recounted:

[Chilean delegate Valenzuela] fully sympathized with the
praiseworthy intentions of the French delegation and agreed that
intellectual production should be protected; but there was also
need to protect the under-developed countries, which had greatly
suffered in the past from their inability to compete in scientific
research and to take out their own patents. As a result, they were
in thrall to the technical knowledge held exclusively by a few
monopolies. As the French amendment would perpetuate that
situation, he would have to vote against it. In general, the subject
was so complex that it would have to be dealt with in a separate
convention than in a single article of the covenant on human
rights.49
Responding to his concern as well as to those of others, French
delegate Pierre Juvigny stated that "[h]e did not agree with the
Chilean representative that monopoly in the field of patents
represented such a grave danger; moreover, the absence of protection
was not a remedy for the unfavourable situation in under-developed
countries." 50 His British colleague, Sir Samuel Hoare, expanded on
this point at greater length:

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
GeneralComment No. 17, supra note 42,
Green, supra note 41, 29.
Id. 31.

4.
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The Chilean representative had raised an interesting point: the
conflict between the conception that the rights of the creative
worker must be protected and the principle that there should be
no obstruction to the general utilization of the results of his work
in the interests of humanity. In the light of these remarks, subparagraph (b) of the original article 30 deserved further
examination. He had always understood it to mean that the
benefits of scientific progress were to be made available to all
within the limits and by use of the machinery which already
existed. If the Chilean representative believed that the clause was
intended to do away with all the intermediaries between the
inventor and the general application of his invention, he was
proposing to reform the world by one brief article. Such a
conception went far beyond the scope of the covenant, and the
United Kingdom delegation could not subscribe to it.5
Notably, all of these delegates distinguished patents from copyrights
based on their impact, rather than their human rights bases or the lack
thereof. Even the Chilean delegate seemed to have agreed that the
present language would cover both copyright and patent protection.
Finally, the increased corporatization of industrial research and
development and the simultaneous lack of focus on "heroic
inventors" may have colored the perception that patent protection
lacks any human right basis. 52 In the copyright area, commentators
have discussed extensively and warned about the construction of the
romantic author.5 3 An equivalent notion of the "lone inventor, 5 4
51. Id.
52. For a discussion of the "heroic inventor" in patent law, see Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 908-22 (2002).
53. See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha
Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of
Authorship in Revolutionary France,1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (1990); Peter Jaszi, Toward
a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Martha
Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the
'Author,' 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984).
54. Janis, supranote 52, at 911.
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however, does not exist in the patent area, except within the patent
bar or in the legislative arena. Indeed, very few commentators, most
have argued for a
notably my former colleague Adam Mossoff,
55
patents.
for
justification
rights
strong natural
Nevertheless, the inventor has not always been a pawn of a
faceless corporation. Before the Second World War, there were still
many glorious individual inventors that deserved recognition. As
children have been taught in elementary schools-whether entirely
correct or not-Samuel Morse invented the telegraph, Alexander
Graham Bell the telephone, Thomas Edison the gramophone and the
light bulb, and Guglielmo Marconi the radio.56 As the focus on
individual inventors increases and their human dimensions are
revealed, the human rights of individual inventors become more
recognizable.57 Thus, one could make a strong claim that the right to
the protection of interests in intellectual creations extends to
individual inventions and that the human rights debate should not
separate patents from copyrights.
QUESTION

4: ARE ALL FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
HUMAN RIGHTS?

In General Comment No. 17, the authoritative interpretation of
article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR, the CESCR distinguished the right to
the protection of interests in intellectual creations, which "derives
from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons," from other legal
entitlements currently recognized in the intellectual property
regime. 58 As the Committee declared:
55. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:An Intellectual History, 15501800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought
About Patents?Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 953
(2007).
56. For an interesting discussion of disputes among major inventors, see generally HAL HELLMAN,
GREAT FEUDS INTECHNOLOGY: TEN OF THE LIVELIEST DISPUTES EVER (2004).
57. Cf. Hughes, supra note 37, at 344 ("With inventions, the object may precede the personality
stake, but with time the scientist or engineer comes to identify himself with his scientific or
technological advances.").
58. General Comment No. 17, supranote 42, 1.
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Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal
entitlements belonging to individuals and, under certain
circumstances, groups of individuals and communities. Human
rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the human person
as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first and
foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for
inventiveness and creativity, encourage the dissemination of
creative and innovative productions, as well as the development
of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific,
literary and artistic productions for the benefit of society as a
whole.5 9

While the two sets of rights can coincide in theory, they diverge in
practice today, due to the high level of protection in the existing
intellectual property system and the system's continuous expansion at
the expense of human rights protection.
Out of all the so-called intellectual property rights, the protection
60
of corporate trademarks is unlikely to be considered a human right.
Likewise, trade secrets that are owned by corporations do not have
any human rights basis, because they are created or developed by
somebody else-their employees. 6 ' Other examples of existing
intellectual property rights that lack human rights aspects are worksmade-for-hire, employee inventions, neighboring rights, database

59. Id.
60. But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, No. 73049/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007) (Grand
Chamber) (holding that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention of Human Rights
protects both registered marks and trademark applications of a multinational corporation). The approach
taken by the European Court of Human Rights is questioned in discussion infra notes 71-73.
61. Compare Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 46
(1989) ("Trade secrets are not defensible on grounds of privacy either. A corporation is not an individual
and hence does not have the personal features privacy is intended to protect."), with Lynn Sharp Paine,
Trade Secrets and the Justificationof Intellectual Property:A Comment on Hettinger,20 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 247, 251 (1991) ("If a person has any right with respect to her ideas, surely it is the right to control
their initial disclosure. A person may decide to keep her ideas to herself, to disclose them to a select few,
or to publish them widely." (footnote omitted)).
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protection, data exclusivity protection, and other rights that protect
62
the economic investments of institutional authors and inventors.
QUESTION 5: CAN CORPORATIONS BRING CLAIMS OF VIOLATION OF
THEIR RIGHT TO THE PROTECTION OF INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL
CREATIONS?

Although there has been a growing expansion of corporate
intellectual property rights, none of these rights would qualify as a
human right. Indeed, as Maria Green pointed out, "the drafters [of the
ICESCR] do not seem to have been thinking in terms of the
corporation-held patent, or the situation where the creator is simply
63
an employee of the entity that holds the patent or the copyright."
Similarly, in General Comment No. 17, the CESCR noted that while
human rights focus on individuals, groups of individuals, and
communities, "intellectual property regimes primarily protect
business and corporate interests and investments." 64 Because
corporations remain outside the protection of human rights
instruments, "their entitlements ...
65
human rights.,

are not protected at the level of

Moreover, human rights are inalienable. While corporations may
have obtained rights from individual authors and inventors through
assignment or under a work-made-for-hire arrangement, the humanrights-based interests of these individuals are not transferable. The
two strongest claims corporate rights holders could make are as
follows: first, because their intellectual property interests were
initially derived from the human-rights-based interests of individual
authors or inventors, damage to corporate interests would jeopardize
these individual interests by reducing the opportunities the
individuals have and the remuneration they will receive; and second,
62. See Chapman, supra note 16, at 316-17 (noting that there is no "basis in human rights to justify
using intellectual property instruments as a means to protect economic investments").
63. Green, supranote 41, 45.
64. General Comment No. 17, supra note 42, 2.
65. Id. 7.
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because corporate rights holders are seeking protection on behalf of
individual shareholders of the human rights-based property interests
in their investments, corporate intellectual property rights need to be
strongly protected.
These claims are rather weak. Even if they were accepted, the
reduction of opportunities and remuneration might not reach the level
of a human rights violation. The protection corporations request
might also exceed the protection of those "basic material interests
which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard
of living. ' 66 As I have discussed elsewhere, the right to the protection
of interests in intellectual creations "was not designed to protect the
67
unqualified property-based interests in intellectual creations.
Rather, the right was instituted to "protect the narrow interest of just
68
remuneration for intellectual labor."
To be certain, states are free to enact laws to protect the humanrights-based interests of individual authors or inventors that are now
assigned to corporations. They can also grant to corporations or other
collective entities human rights-like protection. As Craig Scott
pointed out, "[w]ithin the European regional human rights system,
powerful companies no less than wealthy individuals may bring, and
have indeed brought, claims of violation of their 'human' rights
before the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR]." 69 Although
litigants "have had very limited success invoking Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 due to the European Court's relatively 'social'
conception of both the state and the function of property," 70 their
66. Id. 2.
67. Yu, supra note 7, at 1129.
68. Id.
69. Craig Scott, MultinationalEnterprises and Emergent Jurisprudenceon Violations of Economic,
Social and CulturalRights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TExTBOOK 563, 564 n.3
(Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS]. For

discussions of the relationship between human rights obligations and private actors, see ALISON BRYSK,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE WRONGS: CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (2005); ANDREW

CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993); MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE OF ECHR PROTECTION (2006); Steven R. Ratner,
Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, III YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
70. Scott, supra note 69, at 564 n.3; see also Uma Suthersanen, Towards an InternationalPublic
Interest Rule? Human Rights and International Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH:
OF COMPANIES:
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likelihood of success has been greatly enhanced by the recent
judgement of Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, in which the Grand
Chamber of the ECHR held that Article 1 protects both registered
71
marks and trademark applications of a multinational corporation.
To ensure that corporate intellectual property rights will not be
ratcheted up through their association with human rights, it is
therefore important to distinguish between corporate actors that have
standing to bring human rights claims and those that actually claim
that their "human" rights have been violated. While it is acceptable,
and socially beneficial at times, to allow corporate actors to bring
human rights claims on behalf of individuals whose rights have been
violated, it is disturbing that these collective entities can actually
claim that their "human" rights have been violated.72 As Jack
Donnelly put it emphatically, "[c]ollectivities of all sorts have many
and varied rights. But these are not-cannot be-human rights,
73
unless we substantially recast the concept.,

COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 97, 107 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds.,

2005) ("[Ihe property provision under the [European Convention on Human Rights] is qualified in that
deprivation or third-party use of property is expressly allowed for 'public interest' or 'general interest'
reasons.").
71. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, No. 73049/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11,2007) (Grand Chamber).
For a discussion of the increasing role of the European Court of Human Rights in innovation and
creativity policies in Europe, see Laurence R. Heifer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual
Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2008). For a discussion of
the emerging fundamental rights discourse on intellectual property in Europe, see Christophe Geiger,
"Constitutionalizing" IntellectualProperty Law? The Influence of FundamentalRights on Intellectual
Property in the European Union, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371 (2006).
72. For example, I consider it acceptable and socially beneficial for a newspaper to bring a human
rights lawsuit on behalf of its individual readers, whose rights have been violated and who may not be
able to afford the lawsuit-in terms of either time, energy or resources. However, it would be disturbing
for that newspaper to claim that its human rights have been violated.
73. DONNELLY, supra note 22, at 25.
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QUESTION

6: DOES THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY ALREADY

PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL
CREATIONS?

The intellectual property industries and some commentators often
equate intellectual property protection with the protection of private

property. As two advocates of strong property rights stated:
IP protection has long been recognized as a basic human right,
and the tension between the rights of the creators and the rights
of consumers has been successfully resolved by the development
and modification of intellectual property protections over the
years.
Those who want to weaken IP protections are really tapping
into a failed and discredited economic theory that the public
doesn't benefit from privately owned goods. However,
expropriation of others' property not only undermines creation
and invention, it also undermines economies and societies. It is,
ironically, one of the most "anti-human rights" actions
governments could take.74

Likewise, the entertainment industries have repeatedly condemned
the unauthorized use of copyrighted materials as "theft" and illegal
file-sharers as "shoplifters." 75 According to Frances Preston, the
former president and CEO of Broadcast Music, Inc., a U.S.
performing rights organization: "Illegal downloading of music is
74. Tom Giovanetti & Merrill Matthews, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, IDEAS,
Sept.
2005,
http://www.ipi.org/ipi/IPIPublications.nsf/PublicationLookupFullTextPDF/00393D8BI 791936F862570
EE00779CFC/$File/IPandHumanRights.pdf?OpenElement; see also Robert L. Ostergard Jr., Intellectual
Property: A Universal Human Right?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 175 (1999) ("The basis for such a claim
without doubt lies in the Western conception of property rights.").
75. See Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Recording Industry to Begin Collecting
Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits Against File "Sharers" Who Illegally Offer Music Online (June 25,
2003) (including quotes that described unauthorized use of copyrighted materials as "theft" and illegal
file-sharers
as
"shoplifters"),
http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?
newsyearfilter=&resultpage=46&id=2B9DA9054AOD-8439-7EE1-EC9953A22DB9.
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theft, pure and simple. It robs songwriters, artists and the industry
76
that supports them of their property and their livelihood.,
Despite this modem-day tendency to consider intellectual property
as private property, the international or regional human rights
instruments neither endorse nor reject the use of property rights to
protect interests in intellectual creations. Instead, the instruments
merely identify two distinct interests that are covered by the right to
the protection of interests in intellectual creations: moral interests and
material interests. While the former "safeguards the personal link
between authors and their creations and between peoples,
communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage"
and is generally considered outside the coverage of the right to
private property, the latter "enable[s] authors [and inventors] to enjoy
77
an adequate standard of living.,
On its face, the phrase "material interests" seems to cover the
various forms of economic interests usually protected by the right to
private property. As the CESCR noted in its General Comment No.
17, that phrase "reflects the close linkage of this provision with the
right to own property, as recognized in article 17 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in regional human rights
instruments. 78 When examined closely against the drafting history,
however, the phrase seems to cover a type of economic interest that is
narrower than those usually protected under the right to private
property. As I pointed out elsewhere, that right does not cover all
forms of economic rights as protected in the existing intellectual
property system, but rather the limited interests of authors and
inventors in obtaining just remuneration for their intellectual labor. 79

76. Id. (quoting Frances Preston, former president and CEO of Broadcast Music, Inc.). For an
explanation of why the recording industry did not make the right analogy when it compared individual
file-sharers to shoplifters, see Peter K. Yu, P2Pand the Future ofPrivate Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
653,667-68 (2005).
77. General Comment No. 17, supra note 42, 2; cf ICESCR, supra note 18, art. 1 (1) (recognizing
"the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions").
78. General Comment No. 17, supra note 42, 15.
79. See Yu, supra note 7, at 1088.
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Moreover, due to cold-war politics and concerns raised by Socialist
countries, both the ICCPR and ICESCR do not include a provision on
the right to private property. 80 Although the cold war ended, it
remains unclear whether countries would agree readily to a new
provision on the right to private property. 8 1 Thus, construed in light
of the omission of this provision in the ICESCR and the lack of
evidence to suggest that the delegates agreed to make a special
exception for property rights in intellectual creations, the right
protected in article 15(1)(c) of the Covenant should be considered a
right that exists independently of property rights.
Similarly, although article 17 of the UDHR covers the right to own
property, it does not protect the right to own private property.8 2 In
fact, due to similar concerns raised by the Soviet Union and other
Eastern bloc countries and a strong push by Latin American
countries, the delegates eventually reached a compromise by omitting
the word "private" and by including the phrase "alone as well as in
association with others." 83 As Mary Ann Glendon recounted:
The United States strongly supported a right to own private
property and to be protected against public taking of private
property without due safeguards. The United Kingdom's Labour
government representatives, however, took the position that the
article should be omitted, arguing that regulation of property
rights was so extensive everywhere in the modem world that it
made no sense to speak of a right to ownership. Many Latin
Americans took an entirely different tack: they wanted the article
80. See id. at 1085 n.179.
81. Nevertheless, as Graeme Austin suggested to the author, the holistic approach adopted in the
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples may provide some helpful hints
to how the right to property may be addressed in a post-cold-war environment. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n
on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft UnitedNations Declarationon the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (Aug. 26, 1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 541
(1995) [hereinafter DraftDeclaration].
82. See Scott, supra note 69, at 564 ("[Plost-war notions of the redistributive role of modem states,
as well as newly-decolonized states' reactions to Western corporate power, meant that the right to
property in its classical liberal form did not survive as a self-standing right within a United Nations'
human rights treaty order.").
83. UDHR, supranote 17, art. 17(1).
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to specify a right to enough private property for a decent
existence. The Soviets, for their part, objected to the idea that a
decent existence should be grounded in private property and
insisted that the article should take account of the different
economic systems in various countries. 84
In the end, article 17 "omitt[ed] the word private" and was reduced
to "a high level of generality." 85 It now reads: "(1) Everyone has the
right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2)
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." 86 While "the
right to own property alone" undoubtedly provides a strong textual
basis for unqualified intellectual property rights, the "right to own
property

.

.

.

in association with others" provides an equally

compelling textual basis for the creation of a rich public domain and
for unrestricted access to protected materials--quite different from
the traditional conception of the public domain as "a residual
category of material that for various reasons is not protected by a
property right.",87 Because of this dual nature, article 17 is at best
ambiguous about whether property rights provide the basis for the
right to the protection of material interests in intellectual creations in
article 27(2). In fact, the drafting history seems to suggest otherwise:
countries appear free to decide whether they want to offer strong
intellectual property protection or whether they want to promote the
creation of a rich public domain.
Compared to international human rights instruments, the regional
instruments offer more explicit protection to the right to private
84. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 182 (2001); see also MORSINK, supra note 14, at 139-52 (discussing
the drafting of the right to property provision); Chapman, supra note 16, at 314 ("The socialist bloc's
opposition to property rights had already played a major role in the decision of the Covenant's drafting
committee not to include the text of Article 17 of the UDHR recognising the right to tangible forms of
property in the Covenant.").
85. GLENDON, supra note 84, at 183.

86. UDHR, supra note 17, art. 17.
87. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 183, 184 n.2
(2004); see also Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 137, 137 (1993) (exploring whether the public domain is "simply whatever is left over after
various tests of legal protection have been applied").
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property. For example, article 28 of the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man states that "[e]very person has a right to
own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent
living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the
home." 88 However, as Chilean delegate Hernan Santa Cruz
elaborated on that particular provision during the UDHR drafting
process, "[o]wnership of anything more than [what is required under
this language] might not be considered a basic right." 89 The right to
the protection of interests in intellectual creations therefore covers
only the protection of sufficient intellectual property-based interests;
it does not include the protection of additional interests that are
generally not required to meet the essential needs of decent living or
to maintain human dignity.
Finally, the existing international or regional human rights
instruments do not endorse any particular modality of protection of
interests in intellectual creations. Nor do they delineate the scope of
the right to such protection. Thus, although a property-based
intellectual property system would offer the needed protection to
material interests in intellectual creations, such a regime is not the
only acceptable, or even the best, modality of protection that can be
used to realize the right to the protection of material interests in
intellectual creations. Instead, it merely provides an option, the
effectiveness of which depends on the local conditions of each state.
As GeneralComment No. 17 declared:
The term of protection of material interests under article 15,
paragraph 1(c), need not extend over the entire lifespan of an
author. Rather, the purpose of enabling authors to enjoy an
88. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. 23, May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser.
L./V./11.23, doc. 21 rev. Done in Bogota, Colombia, the American Declaration is sometimes referred to
as the Bogoti Declaration.
89. MORSINK, supra note 14, at 145; see also JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 100

(1987) (denying that "there is a good case on moral grounds for a secure claim to property rights in land
and other major productive resources" and that "the expropriation of such property, when it does not
threaten one's ability to obtain the necessities of life, is a violation of human rights").
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adequate standard of living can also be achieved through onetime payments or by vesting an author, for a limited period of
time, with the exclusive right to exploit his [or her] scientific,
literary or artistic production."
Based on this general interpretative comment, states can satisfy
article 15(1)(c) obligations by deploying such systems as liability
rules, awards or prize funds, or even non-property-based authorship
protection. As the CESCR explained, "the protection under article 15,
paragraph 1(c), need not necessarily reflect the level and means of
protection found in present copyright, patent and other intellectual
property regimes, as long as the protection available is suited to
secure for authors the moral and material interests resulting from
their productions." 91 The key criterion for satisfying the material
interests obligation is not whether the offered protection is based on
the property rights model, but whether the existing system provides
meaningful protection of material interests in the creations by authors
and inventors.
QUESTION 7: CAN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTERESTS BE
BUILT INTO THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM?

When conflicts between human rights and intellectual property
rights arise, policymakers and commentators often explain how
flexibilities can be built into intellectual property systems to
accommodate human rights interests. For example, they describe how
limitations and exceptions can be used to balance the non-human
rights aspects of intellectual property protection against a country's
international human rights obligations. As Audrey Chapman stated,
"[a] human rights approach to intellectual property takes what is
often an implicit balance between the rights of inventors and creators
90. General Comment No. 17, supra note 42,

16; see also Torremans, supra note 2, at 8 ("[A] lot

of freedom is left to Contracting States in relation to the exact legal format of th[e] protection [for the
interests of authors and creators].").
91. General Comment No. 17, supra note 42, 10.
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and the interests of the wider society within intellectual
property
92
exacting."
and
explicit
more
paradigms and makes it far
Similarly, in a background paper submitted to the U.N. SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the
WTO explained how the international trade agreements contain
flexibilities that are needed for the accommodation of human rights
interests. As the WTO stated:
Rights under article 27.2 of the UDHR and article 15.1 (c) of the
ICESCR together with other human rights will be best served,
taking into account their interdependent nature, by reaching an
optimal balance within the IP system and by other related policy
responses. Human rights can be used-and have been and are
currently being used-to argue in favour of balancing the system
either upwards or downwards by means of adjusting the existing
rights or by creating new rights.93
However, the existence of these built-in flexibilities by no means
guarantees the adequate protection of human rights. While limitations
and exceptions tend to allow states to discharge their access-related
human rights obligations, the inclusion of these safeguards may also
undermine the right to the protection of moral interests in intellectual
creations. For example, a broad fair use or fair dealing privilege, or
other limitations or exceptions that loosen up control of copyrighted
works, may weaken the personal link between authors and their
creations. Thus, if a state takes seriously its human rights obligations,
it has to ensure at least the proper identification and attribution of the
creative work and that the work not be recoded or otherwise modified
in a manner that would prejudice the author's honor or reputation.

92. CHAPMAN, supra note 43, at I.

93. WTO Submission, supra note 4, 1 9.
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QUESTION 8: WILL THE HuMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK RATCHET UP
EXISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION?

One of the most predominant concerns about developing a human
rights framework for intellectual property is the ratcheting up of the
already very high protection under the existing international
intellectual property system. 94 As a public domain advocate once told
me, if intellectual property rights are elevated to human rights, "We
are doomed!" Most recently, Kal Raustiala also warned that "the
embrace of [intellectual property] by human rights advocates and
entities ...

is likely to further entrench some dangerous ideas about

property: in particular, that property rights as human rights ought to
be inviolable and ought to receive extremely solicitous attention from
the international community."

95

Indeed, an emphasis on the human rights attributes of intellectual
property rights is likely to further strengthen intellectual property
rights, especially in civil law countries where judges are more likely
to uphold rights that are considered human rights. The development
of a human rights framework for intellectual property therefore may
result in what I have described elsewhere as the undesirable "human
rights ratchet" of intellectual property protection.96 Such development
would exacerbate the already severe imbalance in the existing
intellectual property system and would ultimately backfire on those
who seek to use the human rights forum to enrich the public domain
and to set maximum limits of intellectual property protection.
While I am sympathetic to these concerns, the existing
international human rights instruments have recognized only certain

94. The converse is also true, at least from the perspective of intellectual property rights holders. Just
as public domain advocates are concerned about the upward ratchet of intellectual property rights,
intellectual property rights holders are equally concerned about the downward ratchet of intellectual
property rights. The latter are understandably concerned, because those attributes or forms of intellectual
property rights that do not have a human rights basis are likely to be deemed less important through a
human rights lens.
95. Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in InternationalIntellectual PropertyLaw, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1021, 1032 (2007).
96. Yu, supra note 7, at 1124.
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attributes of existing intellectual property rights as human rights.97
Because only some attributes of intellectual property rights can be
considered human rights, international human rights treaties do not
protect the remaining non-human rights attributes of intellectual
property rights or those forms of intellectual property rights that have
no human rights basis at all. 98 As the CESCR reminded governments
in its Statement on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights,
states have duties to take into consideration their human rights
obligations in the implementation of intellectual property policies and
agreements and to subordinate those policies and agreements to
human rights protection in the event of a conflict between the two. 99
Moreover, although states have obligations to fully protect the
human rights aspects of intellectual property protection, their ability
to fulfill these obligations is often limited by the resources available
to them and the competing demands of other human rights
obligations. Indeed, the right to the protection of interests in
intellectual creations has been heavily circumscribed by the right to
cultural participation and development, the right to the benefits of
scientific progress, the right to food, the right to health, the right to
education, the right to self-determination, as well as many other
human rights.
Some public interest advocates may remain concerned about the
"marriage" of human rights and intellectual property rights by
pointing out that, in a human rights framework, the status of all
intellectual property rights, regardless of their basis, will be elevated
to that of human rights in rhetoric even if that status will not be
elevated in practice. Indeed, intellectual property rights holders have
widely used the rhetoric of private property to support their lobbying
efforts and litigation, !°° despite the many limitations, safeguards, and
obligations in the property system. The property gloss over
intellectual property rights has also confused policymakers, judges,
97.
98.
99.
100.

For a discussion of these attributes, see id. at 1081-92.
For earlier examples, see supratext accompanying notes 61-62.
See Resolution 2000n, supra note 3, 3 (articulating the principle of human rights primacy).
See sources cited in Yu, supra note 7, at 1127 n.319.
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jurors, and commentators, even though there are significant
differences between the attributes of real property and those of
intellectual property.101
While the concerns over rhetorical effects are valid and important,
the best response to alleviate these concerns is not to dissociate
intellectual property rights from human rights or to cover up the fact
that some attributes of intellectual property rights are, indeed,
protected in international or regional human rights instruments.
Rather, it is important to clearly delineate which attributes of
intellectual property rights would qualify as human rights and which
attributes or forms of those rights should be subordinated to human
rights obligations due to their lack of any human right basis. In doing
so, a human rights framework will highlight the moral and material
interests of individual authors and inventors while exposing the
danger of increased expansion of those attributes or forms of
intellectual property rights that have no human rights basis at all.
QUESTION 9: WILL THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK PROMOTE THE
INTERESTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND TRADITIONAL
COMMUNITIES?

When the UDHR and the ICESCR were drafted, the drafters did
not have indigenous groups and traditional communities in mind. As
General Comment No. 17 noted, the words "everyone," "he," and
"author' ''indicate that the drafters of that article seemed to have
believed authors of scientific, literary or artistic productions to be
natural persons, without at that time realizing that they could also be
groups of individuals."' 1 2 The double use of the definite article in
"the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community,"
as compared to "a right 'to participate in the cultural life of his or her
101. For discussions of these differences, see generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1031 (2005); Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property:
The Tenuous Connections Between Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2005). For a discussion
of the controversy surrounding the term "intellectual property," see Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property
and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 1-6.
102. GeneralComment No. 17, supra note 42, 7 (footnote omitted).
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community,"' also betrayed the framers' intent.' 0 3 As Johannes
Morsink observed, "[a]rticle 27 seems to assume that 'the
community' one participates in and with which one identifies
culturally is the dominant one of the nation state. There is no hint
here of multiculturalism or pluralism."' 1 4 In fact, Morsink has shown
convincingly why historical memories, political circumstances,
concerns of the colonial powers, and the lack of political organization
had caused the UDHR drafters to omit a provision on the right to
0 5
protect minorities.1
To make things more complicated, many commentators have
pointed out accurately that the existing intellectual property regime
has ignored the interests of those performing intellectual labor
outside the Western model, such as "custodians of tribal culture and
medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional artistic and
10 6
musical forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties."'
By emphasizing individual authorship and scientific achievement
over collective intellectual contributions, the drafters of the UDHR
and the ICESCR seemed to have subscribed to the traditional
Western worldview of intellectual property protection.
Nevertheless, the fact that the drafters might not have foreseen the
extension of article 27 of the UDHR and article 15(1)(c) of the
ICESCR to traditional communities or other groups of individuals
does not mean that the documents cannot be broadly interpreted to
incorporate collective rights. To begin with, human rights instruments
contain considerable language that allows one to explore collective
rights. Although article 27 of the ICCPR, as compared to a provision
in the UDHR or the ICESCR, is the only article in the International
Bill of Rights that specifically addresses the cultural rights of
minorities, 10 7 references to cultural participation and development
103. See MORSINK, supra note 14, at 269 (discussing the double use of definite article in article 27).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 269-80.
106. Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 192, 193 (1996).
107. Article 27 of the ICCPR provides: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
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appear in many international and human rights instruments, including
the U.N. Charter, the UNESCO Constitution, the Declaration of the
Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
08
Discrimination. 1
In addition, the International Bill of Rights has undertaken a
collective approach to specific rights, including "self-determination,
economic, social and cultural development, communal ownership of
property, disposal of wealth and natural resources, and intellectual
property rights."' 0 9 As Donald Kommers pointed out in his
comparison of the German and U.S. Constitutions, there can be two
visions of personhood: "One vision is partial to the city perceived as
a private realm in which the individual is alone, isolated, and in
competition with his fellows, while the other vision is partial to the
city perceived as a public realm where individual and community are
bound together in some degree of reciprocity."' 10 Drawing on this
distinction, Professor Glendon suggested that the drafters of the
UDHR might have embraced the latter vision:
In the spirit of [this] vision, the Declaration's "Everyone" is an
individual who is constituted, in important ways, by and through
relationships with others. "Everyone" is envisioned as uniquely
valuable in himself (there are three separate references to the free
development of one's personality), but "Everyone" is expected to
act toward others "in a spirit of brotherhood." "Everyone" is
depicted as situated in a variety of specifically named, real-life
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion,
or to use their own language." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16,
1966, 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976).
108. See Stephen A. Hansen, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: Toward Defining Minimum
Core Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights, in CORE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 11, at 279, 282.
109. Id.at 288 (footnote omitted).
110. Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism:A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 867
(1991), quoted in GLENDON, supra note 84, at 227.
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relationships of mutual dependency: families, communities,
religious groups, workplaces, associations, societies, cultures,
nations, and an emerging international order. Though its main
body is devoted to basic individual freedoms, the Declaration
begins with an exhortation to act in "a spirit of brotherhood" and
ends with community, order, and society.'
Moreover, human rights continue to evolve and expand," l2 and
there has been a growing trend to extend human rights to groups,
despite the original intentions of the framers of the UDHR and the
ICESCR. As General Comment No. 17 stated:
Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal
entitlements belonging to individuals and, under certain
circumstances, groups of individuals and communities..
Although the wording of article 15, paragraph 1(c), generally
refers to the individual creator ("everyone", "he", "author"), the
right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from one's scientific, literary or artistic
productions can, under certain circumstances, also be enjoyed by
groups of individuals or by communities." 3
The CESCR's interpretative comment is strongly supported by
international law. As the International Court of Justice declared in the
Namibia Advisory Opinion, "[a]n international instrument has to be
interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation."114 The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties also requires subsequent

11 . GLENDON, supra note 84, at 227.
112. See Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell, Introduction to CORE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 11, at
1, 13 ("[H]uman rights standards evolve over time and in the direction of expansiveness."); see also
SEP(ILVEDA, supra note 6, at 81-84 (discussing the evolutive interpretation of human rights treaties).
113. General Comment No. 17, supra note 42,
1, 8 (emphasis added).
114. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 31, 53 (June 21) (emphasis added).

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:4

agreement and practice to be taken into account in treaty
interpretation. 115
In the context of cultural fights, this comment also makes a lot of
sense. As Asbjorn Eide aptly observed, "[t]he basic source of identity
for human beings is often found in the cultural traditions into which
he or she is born and brought up. The preservation of that identity can
be of crucial importance to well-being and self-respect." 116 It is
therefore no surprise that General Comment No. 17 stated that "States
parties in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist are
under an obligation to protect the moral and material interests of
authors belonging to these minorities through special measures to
preserve the distinctive character of minority cultures.""' 7 As the
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognized:
Indigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of the full
ownership, control and protection of their cultural and
intellectual property.
They have the right to special measures to control, develop
and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural
manifestations, including human and other genetic resources,
seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora,
oral tradition, literatures, designs and visual and performing
arts.

118

As indigenous rights strengthen, the use of the human rights regime
may even alleviate the existing bias against those performing
intellectual labor outside the Western model." 9

115. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), openedfor signatureMay 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered intoforce Jan. 27, 1980).
116. Asbjorn Eide, Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 289, 291.
117. GeneralComment No. 17, supra note 42, 33.
118. Draft Declaration,supra note 81, art. 29.
119. Thanks to Katja Weckstrom for making this suggestion.
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QUESTION 10: WILL THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK PROMOTE THE
INTERESTS OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES?

Less developed countries have taken advantage of the human
rights regime to "grow proposals that seek to roll back intellectual
property rights or at least eschew further expansions of the monopoly
privileges they confer."' 120 By shifting from one regime to another,
these countries were able to alter the status quo or to create tactical
advantages by relocating to a more sympathetic forum, such as the
public health or human rights regime. 12 1 From the standpoint of less
developed countries, the human rights regime has several benefits. It
contains important built-in institutional safeguards to protect the
poor, the marginalized, and the less powerful. In addition,
nongovernmental organizations and less developed countries are very
well-represented in the regime. They also have been more active than
transnational corporations and their supporting developed countries,
which often find alien the human rights language and the forum
structure.
In recent years, there have been increasing activities in the WTO
and WIPO exploring the relationship between human rights and
intellectual property rights. For example, in November 1998, WIPO
conducted a panel discussion on "Intellectual Property and Human
Rights.' 22 The WTO, in particular the TRIPS Council, has also paid
closer attention to the lack of access to patented pharmaceuticals in
120. Laurence R. Heifer, Toward a Human Rights Frameworkfor Intellectual Property, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 971, 974-75 (2007).
121. See Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 59 (2004) (stating that less
developed countries have used regime shifting "as an intermediate strategy... to generate the political
groundwork necessary for new rounds of intellectual property lawmaking in the WTO and WIPO");
Heifer, supra note 120, at 974-75 (stating that less developed countries and their supporting
nongovernmental organizations "have decamped to more sympathetic multilateral venues.., where they
have found more fertile soil in which to grow proposals that seek to roll back intellectual property rights
or at least eschew further expansions of the monopoly privileges they confer"). For discussions of the
regime-shifting phenomenon, see generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS

REGULATION 564-71 (2000); Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra; Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents
in the InternationalIntellectual PropertyRegime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 323, 408-16 (2004).
122. World Intellectual Prop. Org., Panel Discussion on Intellectual Property and Human Rights
Geneva (Nov. 9, 1998), http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/papers/index.html.
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light of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria pandemics in Africa
and other less developed countries. Such attention eventually resulted
in the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
formally amend the TRIPs
Public Health 123 and a recent protocol to 24
1
Ibis.
3
article
Agreement by adding a new
Notwithstanding its benefits, a human rights framework for
intellectual property does not favor less developed countries on every
count. Indeed, the right to the protection of moral interests in the
intellectual creations exceeds even the high standards of protection
offered under U.S. intellectual property laws. As Professor Helfer put
it:

A human rights framework for authors' rights is thus both more
protective and less protective than the approach endorsed by
copyright and neighboring rights regimes. It is more protective in
that rights within the core zone of autonomy [that is protected by
human rights instruments] are subject to a far more stringent
limitations test than the one applicable contained in intellectual
property treaties and national laws. It is also less protective,
however, in that a state need not recognize any authors' rights
lying outside of this zone or, if it does recognize such additional
rights, it must give appropriate weight to other social, economic,
and cultural rights and to the public's interest in access to
knowledge.

125

123. WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001,
7,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002). The Doha Declaration delayed the formal introduction of
patent protection for pharmaceuticals and of the protection of undisclosed regulatory data in least
developed countries until January 1, 2016.
124. If adopted, article 31bis would allow those WTO member states that had insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals. See Council for TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the General Council
Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Proposal for a Decision on an Amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement,
IP/C/41
(Dec.
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news05_e/trips decision-e.doc. For a discussion of the proposed
article 3 Ibis, see Yu, supranote 28, at 872-86.
125. Heifer, supra note 120, at 997.
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Such protection therefore may limit access to protected materials and
frustrate projects that facilitate greater unauthorized recoding or reuse of existing creative works.
Indeed, General Comment No. 17 included a more stringent test
than the three-step test laid out in the Berne Convention, the TRIPs
Agreement, and the WIPO Internet Treaties, 12 6 which "confine
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder."' 127 As the CESCR stated, to be compliant with the ICESCR,
the limitations "must be determined by law in a manner compatible
with the nature of these rights, must pursue a legitimate aim, and
must be strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in
a democratic society, in accordance with article 4 of the
Covenant.'' 128 They must also be proportionate and compatible with
other provisions and must offer a least restrictive means to achieve
the goals. 129 Under certain circumstances, "[t]he imposition of
limitations may... require compensatory measures, such as payment
of adequate compensation for the use of scientific, literary or artistic
' 30
productions in the public interest."'
Moreover, there remains continuous tension between human rights
protection and economic development.' 31 Although commentators
and policymakers have explained at length why stronger intellectual
126. See id. at 994-95 (observing that CESCR's test for assessing legality of state restrictions on the
right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations is "far more constraining than the now
ubiquitous 'three-step test' used to assess the treaty-compatibility of exceptions and limitations in
national copyright and patent laws" (footnote omitted)). For the incorporation of the three-step test in
international intellectual property treaties, see WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 10, adopted Dec. 20, 1996,
36 I.L.M. 65; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 16(2), adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
76; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 13, 30; Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at ParisJuly 24, 1971, art. 11, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
127. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1,art. 13.
128. General Comment No. 17, supra note 42, 22.
129. See id 23.
130. Id 24 (footnote omitted).
131. For discussion of the tension between human rights and economic development, see generally
DONNELLY, supra note 22, at 109-10, 194-203. For an excellent discussion of how to recalibrate the
concept of intellectual property in light of the development concept, see generally Margaret Chon,
Intellectual Propertyand the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006).
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property protection would promote economic development, there is
significant empirical evidence showing that stronger protection does
not benefit countries that lack a strong imitative capacity and a
sufficiently large market.' 32 There also remains a serious challenge
concerning whether less developed countries would be able to
consider the right to the protection of interests in intellectual
creations as important as such other human rights as the right to food,
the right to health, the right to education, the right to cultural
participation and development, the right to the benefits of scientific
progress, and the right to self-determination-all of which are
presumed to be "universal, indivisible and interdependent and
133
interrelated."'
Finally, some commentators may question whether the human
rights framework will be sensitive to the needs and interests of less
developed countries, rather than simply reinforcing values that are
already accepted in the Western developed world. Indeed, when the
UDHR was being drafted, the American Anthropological Association
sent a long and now-infamous memorandum to the Human Rights
Commission, expressing its concern, or even fear, that the
Declaration would become an ethnocentric document. As the
Association's executive board put it, "the primary task confronting
those who would draw up a Declaration on the Rights of Man is...,
in essence, to resolve the following problem: How can the proposed
Declaration be applicable to all human beings, and not be a statement
of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the
134
countries of Western Europe and America?"'
One may also recall the Bangkok Declaration at the Asian
preparatory regional conference before the World Conference on

132. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,

TRADE AND

DEVELOPMENT:

STRATEGIES

TO OPTIMIZE

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT INA TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 176-80 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007).
133. Vienna Declaration,supra note 19, 5.
134. Am. Anthropological Ass'n, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 539
(1947).
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Human Rights in 1993.13' Although that document did not mention
the oft-discussed "Asian values," it states explicitly that, "while
human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the
context of a dynamic and evolving process of international normsetting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional
particularities 36and various historical, cultural and religious
'
backgrounds."'
Fortunately, the right to the protection of interests in intellectual
creations presents fewer cultural problems than civil and political
rights. To begin with, the drafting history strongly suggests the
drafters' determination to create a universal document and their
reluctance to introduce language that was tailored toward a particular
form of political or economic system.' 37 The government delegates
had diverse cultural and religious backgrounds, 138 and a large array of
governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,
and private entities participated in the drafting process.' 39 Even when
countries, in particular those from the Eastern Bloc, abstained from
voting for the final adoption of article 27 of the UDHR and article 15
of the ICESCR, they were able to influence the outcome by joining
the discussions; submitting comments, drafts, and amendments; and
participating in some of the preliminary voting. 140 Thus, as Lebanese
delegate Charles Malik recounted, "[t]he genesis of each article, and
each part of each article, [in the UDHR] was a dynamic process in

135. World Conference on Human Rights, Regional Meeting for Asia, Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1993, Report
of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/htm/menu5/wcbangk.htm.
136. Id. 8. For discussions of Asian values and the Bangkok Declaration, see sources cited in Yu,
supra note 7, at 1142 n.380.
137. See MORSINK, supra note 14, at 149 ("It is this dual character [in article 17] that makes the
Universal Declaration condone both the capitalist and socialist ways of organizing a national
economy.").
138. See id. at 21; DONNELLY, supra note 22, at 22 n.l.
139. See MORSINK, supra note 14, at 9 (noting the presence of a large number of nongovernmental
organizations in the Second Session of the Human Rights Commission).
140. See id. at 21 ("Even the abstaining delegations had cooperated in the procedures. They too had
sent delegates to the sessions and these representatives had made comments, voted numerous times, and
even submitted drafts or amendments.").
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which many minds, interests, backgrounds, legal systems and
14 1
ideological persuasions played their respective determining roles."'
Even if one questions the diversity of the perspectives advanced by
delegates from non-European countries in light of their educational or
colonial backgrounds,' 42 one cannot ignore the fact that many
Western countries, in particular Britain and the United States, had
been reluctant to recognize economic, social, and cultural rights as
human rights during the UDHR and ICESCR drafting processes. It is
no accident that those rights were left out of the initial discussions of
the now-abandoned Covenant on Human Rights. Nor is it a surprise
that economic, social, and cultural rights have remained "the least
well-developed and the least doctrinally prescriptive. ' ' 143 In fact,
"[w]ithin some societies in the West, cultural traditions persist based
on a strong faith in full economic liberalism and a severely
44
constrained role for the state in matters of welfare."'
More importantly, the United States, along with Britain,
consistently opposed the recognition of the right to the protection of
interests in intellectual creations during the formative periods of both
the UDHR and ICESCR. During the drafting of the UDHR, both U.S.
delegate Eleanor Roosevelt and British delegate Geoffrey Wilson
objected to the inclusion of draft article 43 in the UDHR in
anticipation of the creation of the Universal Copyright Convention, a
141.

GLENDON, supra note 84, at 225 (quoting Charles Habib Malik, Introduction to 0. FREDERICK

NOLDE, FREE AND EQUAL: HUMAN RIGHTS IN ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE 11, 11-12 (1968)).

142. As one commentator noted:
[Tihose members of the [Human Rights] Commission who represented non-European
countries were, themselves, largely educated in the European tradition, either in Europe
or the United States or in the institutions established in their own countries by
representatives of European colonial powers. Although there were occasional references
to relevant ideas in non-European traditions such as Confucian or Islamic thought, a
European and American frame of reference dominated the deliberations from which the
Universal Declaration emerged.
M. Glen Johnson, A Magna Cartafor Mankind: Writing the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, in
M. GLEN JOHNSON & JANUSZ SYMONIDES, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A
HISTORY OF ITS CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION, 1948-1998, 19, 46-47 (1998).

143. Heifer, supra note 120, at 987; accord CHAPMAN, supra note 43, at 3 (characterizing article 15
of ICESCR "as the most neglected set of provisions within an international human rights instrument
whose norms are not well developed").
144. Asbjorn Eide, Economic Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 9, 11.
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Berne-minus international copyright treaty created under the auspices
of UNESCO. 145 As they claimed, "this right belonged more properly
'to the domain of copyrights." ' 146 Later, during the drafting of the
now-abandoned Covenant on Human Rights, Roosevelt stated:
In her delegation's opinion the subject of copyright should not be
dealt with in the Covenant, because it was already under study by
UNESCO which ...was engaged on the collation of copyright

laws with the object of building up a corpus of doctrine and in
due course drafting a convention. Until all the complexities of
that subject had been exhaustively studied, it would be
impossible to lay down a general principle concerning it for
147
inclusion in the Covenant.
In sum, the right to the protection of interests in intellectual
creations is not as biased against non-Western countries and
traditional communities as some might have thought. Instead, it
represented protection that Western countries, in particular the United
States, were very reluctant to accept (at least shortly after the Second
World War).
There remains the challenging question about whether a human
rights framework for intellectual property can be designed in a way
that will avoid the creation of the notorious one-size-fits-all templates
that have been used to transplant intellectual property laws from
developed to less developed countries. Fortunately, the ECHR has

145. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
The Universal Copyright Convention allowed the United States to participate without either lowering
the existing standards of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works or
requiring the United States to offer the higher protection required by the latter. For discussions of the
Convention, see ARPAD BOGSCH, UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION: AN ANALYSIS AND
COMMENTARY (1958); UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED (Theodore R. Kupfernan &

Matthew Foner eds., 1955).
146. MORSINK, supra note 14, at 220.
147. Green, supra note 41, 23.
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advanced a deferential approach that allows for a "wide margin of
appreciation. , 148 As Professor Heifer noted:
[T]he ECHR gives significant deference to "the legislature's
judgment as to what is in the public interest unless that judgment
is manifestly without reasonable foundation." It also stresses the
"wide margin of appreciation" that states enjoy "with regard both
to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining
whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the
general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law
49
in question."'
If this approach is incorporated into the framework, countries are
likely to be able to develop a balanced intellectual property system
that takes into consideration their international human rights
obligations while at the same time maintaining the policy space
needed for the development of a system that appreciates their local
needs, national interests, technological capabilities, institutional
50
capacities, and public health conditions. 1
CONCLUSION

With the continuous expansion of intellectual property rights, a
growing need for the development of a human rights framework for
intellectual property has arisen. Developing such a framework,
however, is not easy. It raises more questions than it answers, and its
advocates often have to defend positions that please neither
intellectual property rights holders nor public domain activists. In
fact, both groups are likely to find the framework unsatisfactory, even
though such a framework is preferable to the alternative proposed by
148. For a discussion of the margin of appreciation doctrine embraced by the ECHR, see Laurence R.
Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement: The Casefor a European Human
Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 404-05 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
149. Heifer, supra note 71, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
150. For a discussion of the enclosure of the policy space less developed countries have in designing
intellectual property systems that fit their needs, interests, and goals, see generally Yu, supranote 28.
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either group. Thus, if one expects clear-cut answers to his or her
questions, one should avoid asking questions about the partial
marriage of intellectual property and human rights.

